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INTRODUCTION
The rule of automatic reversal requires appellate courts to reverse all
criminal convictions tainted by certain errors. The Supreme Court calls these
errors "structural errors" and distinguishes them from "trial errors" that do not
require an automatic reversal.' When an appellate court confronts a new type
of error, the court must decide whether to treat it as a structural error (which
must be reversed automatically) or as a trial error (which does not always
require reversal). This Note describes an important and previously
undocumented doctrinal consequence of labeling a type of error as
"structural": over time, the rule of automatic reversal narrows the definitions of
structural errors and thereby weakens the procedural safeguards that protect
defendants. To avoid that consequence, this Note proposes a new framework
for deciding whether a type of error is "structural." The proposed test is
straightforward: a type of error should only be labeled as "structural" (and
therefore reversed automatically) if it never contributes to a verdict.
To illustrate, consider the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez.2 There, the defendant hired an out-of-state lawyer to
represent him; that lawyer filed a motion for admission pro hac vice so that he
could participate in the trial.3 The district court erroneously denied that
motion, and as a result the defendant went to trial without his preferred
lawyer. He lost. On appeal, the government conceded that the district court
was wrong to deny the pro hac vice motion, but argued that the error was
harmless. To decide the case, the Court had to determine whether this type of
error - depriving the defendant of his counsel of choice - is a "structural error"
requiring automatic reversal, or a "trial error" that does not always require
reversal. 4 To make this determination, the Court applied the test it set out
fifteen years earlier in Arizona v. Fulminante.s Under that test, the error is
"structural" because it "bears directly on the framework within which the trial
proceeds"; as a structural error, it must be reversed automatically.6
Under this Note's proposed framework, by contrast, the Court would have
asked instead whether this type of error-the erroneous deprivation of
defendant's counsel of choice -never contributes to a verdict. The answer to
1. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-12 (1991).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
3. Id. at 2560.
4. Id. at 2563-64.
5. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-12.
6. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2564 (citation omitted).
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that question is "no" -this type of error contributes to the verdict in almost
every case. Therefore, under this Note's proposed test, the Court would have
held that this type of error is a "trial error" and would then have asked whether
the error was harmless in this particular case.
To determine whether the error was harmless, the Court would have
applied the test for harmlessness articulated in Chapman v. California,
according to which a constitutional error is harmless if on appeal the
prosecution proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'7 Had the Court applied the
Chapman test, it would have found abundant doubt regarding whether the
particular error in Gonzalez-Lopez contributed to the verdict and likely would
have concluded that the error therefore was not harmless.8 Because the error
was not harmless, the Court would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In short, regardless of whether the Court labeled this type of error as a
"structural error" or a "trial error," the outcome would have been the same:
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
But the outcomes of future cases will be affected by the Court's decision in
Gonzalez-Lopez to treat this type of error as structural. As Part II demonstrates,
over the long run the rule of automatic reversal narrows the definitions of
structural errors and thereby weakens constitutional safeguards that protect
defendants. Part II examines three procedural rights: the right to an unbiased
judge; the right to a defense counsel free from conflicts of interest; and the
right to an adequate jury instruction on the meaning of reasonable doubt. The
doctrinal fates of these rights suggest that courts have weakened all three to
avoid applying the drastic remedy of automatic reversal. It is therefore likely
that in the long run, Gonzalez-Lopez will generate case law that approves trial
courts' denials of defense lawyers' pro hac vice motions; that case law, in turn,
will make it more difficult for defendants to secure the counsel of their choice.
Because the rule of automatic reversal tends to narrow the definitions of the
rights that the rule protects, this Note proposes a new, more limited test for
determining whether a given type of error is structural. Under this test, only
types of error that never contribute to the verdict would be labeled "structural"
and automatically reversed. Part III describes and critiques the current
Fulminante test for determining when an error is "structural" and describes the
proposed alternative. First, however, Part I discusses the scholarship on
automatic reversal.
7. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
8. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 256o-61 (describing the facts).
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I. THE DEFENDERS OF AUTOMATIC REVERSAL
With few exceptions, legal scholarship on automatic reversal urges the courts
to extend the rule of automatic reversal to more errors of criminal procedure.
This Part describes that literature and shows that legal scholars have so far failed
to appreciate the problem described below in Part II, namely, that the rule causes
subsequent courts to narrow the definition of the right protected by the rule. To
be sure, existing scholarship is correct that automatic reversal should apply to
some types of error -namely, to those types of error that never contribute to a
verdict. As Part III discusses in detail, automatic reversal is the only workable
rule for those types of error. But in addition to those types of error, scholars have
urged courts to extend automatic reversal to many other types of error that do
contribute to a verdict. In so doing, scholars may have indirectly contributed to
an erosion of the procedures that protect defendants.
Some scholars argue that every constitutional error, simply because it violates
the Constitution, must be reversed automatically; anything less than automatic
reversal, these scholars suggest, is not enough to right a constitutional wrong.9
This argument now appears somewhat dated; the Supreme Court has made clear
that many constitutional errors can indeed be harmless.'
9. A typical and oft-cited example of this argument is Professor Steven Goldberg's sharp criticism
of Chapman. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (198o). Another frequently cited example is Professor Charles Ogletree's
strong disapproval of Fulminante, which held that erroneous admission of coerced confessions
is not a structural error. Ogletree argued that automatic reversal is the only way that appellate
courts can "vindicate" constitutional procedural rights. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment,
Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105
HARv. L. REv. 152 (1991). Other scholars have made the same point. E.g., Francis A. Allen, A
Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review,
70 IowA L. REv. 311, 329-35 (1985) (claiming that automatic reversal weakens constitutional
protections in state courts); Stuart P. Green, The Challenge of Harmless Error, 59 LA. L. REv.
11O1, 1103 (1999) (warning that harmless-error analysis "creates the danger that the
constitutionally prescribed role of the jury might be undermined").
Justice Scalia has made a related argument that certain errors must be considered
structural because these errors prevent the jury from reaching a verdict. Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Put another way, appellate courts
cannot determine how these errors contribute to the verdict because these errors prevent the
jury from ever reaching a valid verdict. Scholars have echoed Scalia's arguments. E.g., Linda
E. Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's
"No Harm, No Foul" Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 229 (2001).
1o. E.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006) (fact-finding by judge in violation of
defendant's right to jury trial); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 76 (2004)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (violation of the Confrontation Clause); Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-
lo (failure to instruct the jury on an element of the crime).
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Professors Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton argue that the rule of automatic
reversal deters "law enforcement officials" from committing procedural
errors." But Stacy and Dayton offer no reason to think that a reversal impresses
law enforcement officials more than does, say, a sternly worded opinion that
both condemns the error and affirms the verdict. Nor do Stacy and Dayton
consider whether the rule of automatic reversal may lead appellate courts to
define the scope of error more narrowly, and thereby ratify conduct that would
otherwise have been condemned and forbidden.
Scholars also argue that automatic reversal is a cost-efficient way of
maximizing the number of correct appellate decisions. If certain types of error are
almost always prejudicial to the defendant, the argument goes, those types of
error ought to be reversed automatically to save appellate courts the effort of
deciding whether a particular error was harmless in a particular case. Professor
Philip Mause made this argument two years after the Court decided Chapman;
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have since restated it with
more theoretical rigor.'3 The problem with Landes and Posner's defense of
automatic reversal is that they assume that each type of error is clearly defined.
In other words, they assume that appellate courts can effortlessly determine
whether, for example, a trial court's denial of a defense lawyer's pro hac vice
motion was correct or erroneous. But that assumption is false: types of error
are not so clearly defined- in many cases, it is debatable whether an error
occurred at all. The initial decisions that establish an error rarely define the
error in terms that are specific enough to decide easily whether later trials are
erroneous or not. Because errors are vaguely defined, appellate courts have
great latitude to find that, in a later trial, no error occurred at all. Part II, below,
describes three areas of the law in which appellate courts have done just that.
II. THE DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMATIC REVERSAL
This Part examines in detail three errors that trigger automatic reversal:
judicial bias; deprivation of conflict-free defense counsel; and failure to instruct
the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt. In each case, the rule of
automatic reversal has created a conflict between two distinct purposes of
ii. Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79,
95-98 (1988).
12. See Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California,
53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 535-37 (1969).
13. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 169-70
(2001).
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appellate review. One purpose of appellate review is retrospective: the court
must examine the fairness of the particular trial at issue in order to affirm a
fairly obtained verdict and reverse an unfairly obtained verdict. A second
purpose of appellate review is prospective: the court must articulate the best
practices and procedures for future trials. The following Section describes a
theory of how automatic reversal forces an appellate court to choose between
those two purposes; the later Sections use that theory to explain the doctrinal
history of the three errors described above. The final Section offers responses
to expected objections.
A. A Three-Generational Theory ofAppellate Review of Error
Imagine three generations of criminal appeals where the defendant in each
claims that his trial judge was biased against him. Imagine further that the
first-generation appeal is an easy case: the defendant's trial judge had plenary
power to convict and a direct financial incentive to do so. The Supreme Court
finds that the judge was biased, holds that the defendant's due process rights
were violated, and reverses the conviction. In this case, the retrospective and
prospective purposes of appellate review work in tandem. The Court reverses
because the trial was unfair; that reversal establishes the rule that future trials
may not be conducted by biased judges. The Court does not pause to consider
whether in future appeals such an error could be found harmless under the
Chapman v. California test for harmlessness -that is, the Court does not
consider whether the prosecution might, in some future cases, be able to avoid
reversal by proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
14
Now imagine, years later, that a second-generation case reaches an
appellate court. This case is more difficult: a jury convicted the defendant, but
the judge presiding over that jury had crossed swords with the defendant years
earlier while working as a prosecutor and may have harbored a grudge against
him. Yet despite that possible bias, the judge's rulings were all straightforward
and unobjectionable, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and the jury's
deliberations were brief. In reviewing the guilty verdict, the appellate court is
forced to choose between the prospective and retrospective purposes of
appellate review. Looking forward, the court may wish to establish a clear rule
that in these circumstances, trial judges should recuse themselves. But looking
14. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). If the Court had applied Chapman to this hypothetical case, it would
have found that there was reasonable doubt as to whether this error contributed to the
verdict and reversed. The verdict was entirely in the judge's hands, and only the judge could
have known whether the financial temptation contributed to his decision.
1186
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backward, the appellate court may be reluctant to reverse this particular
conviction because the court is certain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that bias
did not contribute to the jury's verdict. The appellate court will be reluctant to
reverse the conviction for several reasons. First, many cases are costly to retry.
Second, appeals take years to complete. By the time the defendant is retried,
evidence may have disappeared and witnesses may have moved away. Finally,
many of the second-generation cases discussed below are federal habeas
petitions reviewing state court judgments that are five, ten, or even twenty
years old."s Retrials may simply be impossible in such cases.
Harmless-error review would allow the appellate court to achieve both
purposes. Looking forward, the court could both find that a serious error
occurred and hold that the error ought never be repeated. Looking backward,
the court could find that the error did not affect the verdict. For example, in
United States v. Jordan, the Fifth Circuit held that the district judge erred by
presiding over the trial of a defendant who had harmed the judge's personal
friend.6 Yet the appellate court also affirmed the conviction because the error
did not contribute to the jury's verdict; the trial had been competently
conducted. 7 That holding established an important precedent under the
federal judicial recusal statute, 8 but it did not incur the high cost of reversing
the conviction.
The rule of automatic reversal, however, makes such a solution impossible.
If the appellate court were to declare that an error occurred- thereby setting a
precedent that judges must recuse themselves in such circumstances -then the
court would also be forced to reverse the conviction. Such a result, looking
backward, may be deeply troubling, especially if the evidence is overwhelming
and if the state will not be able to retry the case. Faced with this conflict
between the prospective and retrospective purposes of appellate review, many
second-generation appellate courts choose to affirm the conviction by declaring
that no error occurred. '9 Appellate judges are reluctant to reverse a conviction
when they are certain that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. In
15. E.g., Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (reviewing a state trial that
occurred in 1982).
16. 49 F.3d 152, 159 (sth Cir. 1995).
I. Id.
i8. Id. at 158-59.Jordan considered the federal judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000),
rather than the Due Process Clause right to an unbiased decision maker. Despite that
difference, the case shows that such errors can be reviewed for harmlessness and need not be
reversed automatically.
19. See infra notes 38-43 (judicial bias); infra notes 75-80 (conflicted counsel); infra notes 96-105
(flawed jury instruction on the meaning of reasonable doubt).
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such cases, the appellate courts might want to write an opinion finding error
but are unwilling to reverse the conviction to do it. Scholars have observed this
phenomenon in studying the outcomes of Batson v. Kentucky2' appeals, in
which defendants claim that the prosecution discriminated against prospective
jurors. Professor Pamela Karlan summed up other scholars' studies of Batson
appeals as follows: "[W]hen [appellate] courts cannot calibrate the remedy [of
reversal], they fudge on the right instead," and hold that the defendant's right
was not violated.2 1 That memorable phrase describes not only the case law applying
Batson, but also the case law governing all other errors to which the rule of automatic
reversal applies. The Sections below tell the same story about three other types
of error. For each type of error, second-generation decisions affirmed
convictions by finding that no error occurred; those decisions thereby created
precedents that narrowed the definition of the error and the scope of
defendants' right.
Would the first- and second-generation outcomes have differed if the
appellate courts had reviewed the convictions for harmless error under
Chapman, and thus had required the prosecution to prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained" ?2' To the defendants, no. The first-generation defendant's
conviction still would have been reversed (because the error did contribute to
the verdict); the second-generation defendant's conviction still would have
been affirmed (because the error, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not
contribute to the verdict). But the doctrinal outcomes would have differed. The
second-generation court reached its decision only by narrowing the definition
of the error. That doctrinal difference may not matter to the second-generation
defendant, but it might make all the difference to a third-generation defendant.
Imagine a third-generation trial in which the defendant's guilt is in real
doubt. Imagine also that the evidence of the judge's bias is precisely the same
as the evidence of bias in the controlling second-generation precedent -here
again, the judge prosecuted the defendant for a different crime years earlier.
The defendant asks the former prosecutor to recuse himself and invokes the
first-generation precedent condemning bias; the judge, however, cites the
more recent second-generation precedent and stays on the case. During the
trial that follows, the judge's evidentiary rulings -arguably incorrect, but not
an abuse of discretion - permit the prosecution to introduce evidence that
20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2001, 2015 (1998).
22. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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sways the jury to convict. Here, then, the second-generation precedent has
made all the difference. By narrowing the definition of "bias," the second-
generation precedent has permitted a trial that the first-generation precedent
prohibited. And if the third-generation defendant appeals his conviction, and
claims that in his case (unlike in the second-generation case) bias really did
alter the course of the trial, and really did contribute to the verdict, that appeal
will fail. The defendant cannot argue that he was prejudiced without first
showing that an error occurred, and the second-generation case held that no
error occurred.
It is therefore no surprise that the Federal Reporter contains little evidence
of third-generation appeals. There is no reason for an appellate court to write
an opinion saying,
If we were not bound by second-generation precedent to conclude that
no error occurred here, then we would find that this was an error. And
if we were not also bound by first-generation precedent to treat such
errors as requiring automatic reversal, then we would apply harmless-
error review, would find that the error may have contributed to the
verdict, and so would reverse. But we do not do any of this because, as
mentioned, the second-generation case requires us to find that no error
occurred in the first place. There is therefore no need for us to decide
whether what happened here, if it were error, would be harmless.
In fact, there are very good reasons for courts not to publish such an opinion. It
is dicta; it is wasted effort; it saps the public's faith in the courts. The evidence
of third-generation cases - in the form of published appellate opinions-is
therefore scarce. But it does not follow that the cases themselves are rare.
Throughout the rest of this Part, some possible third-generation cases are
identified -that is, cases that may have ended in acquittal or reversal if not for
the narrowing effect of second-generation precedents.
The next three Sections apply the three-generational theory to the doctrinal
history of three different errors that trigger automatic reversal: judicial bias;
deprivation of conflict-free defense counsel; and failure to instruct the jury on
the meaning of reasonable doubt.
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B. The Diminished Meaning of "Bias"
In its 1955 decision In re Murchison, the Supreme Court set a new standard
for when a trial judge must recuse himself for bias. 3 This Section explains how
later decisions diluted the Murchison standard by narrowing the meaning of
"bias" back to what it had been at the common law: direct financial interest in
the outcome. 4 This Section suggests that this narrowing occurred because the
Court set the rule that a "biased" judge requires an automatic reversal.
Murchison held that a judge who sat as a one-man grand jury could not
later judge the contempt trials of witnesses who perjured themselves during
the judge's closed grand jury sessions." Murchison reasoned that a judge who
had himself accused the defendant of contempt could not later be "wholly
disinterested" when presiding over the defendant's contempt trial 6 Murchison
reversed the conviction without considering whether the judge's bias though
error-was nevertheless harmless.2" This failure to consider the error's possible
harmlessness is entirely understandable in context: in Murchison and other bias
cases, the Court was interested in eliminating what it saw as the inherent
unfairness of peculiar state court practices in which one man sat as judge, jury,
and prosecutor.s A reversal would get the states' attention; holding the error
harmless would not.
Murchison and the other early bias cases did not explain why bias cannot be
harmless. In later cases, however, the Court came up with an explanation. In
Chapman, the case in which the Court held that some constitutional errors can
be harmless, the Court explained that bias is not such an error; bias must be
reversed automatically because the right to an unbiased judge is "so basic to a
23. 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).
24. At common law, financial bias was the only type of bias that required judges to recuse
themselves. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361.
25. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 139.
28. In another example, the Court reversed the conviction of a bootlegger who had been tried
before a town mayor. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). In Tumey, an Ohio statute
gave the mayor power to determine guilt and to levy fines on the guilty, and the town's
funding scheme gave him "a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome.
Id. at 523. If the mayor convicted, the town reimbursed his "costs." Id. at 520. A unanimous
Court held that the trial violated Tumey's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Id.
at 514-15. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the Court reversed another
conviction from an Ohio mayor's court. And in Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977), the
Court vacated a conviction secured based on evidence seized pursuant to a warrant signed by
a justice of the peace whose salary was based on the number of warrants he approved.
1190
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fair trial" that bias "can never be treated as harmless error."2 9 The Court has
repeated that explanation ever since in continuing to hold that "bias" requires
automatic reversal.
30
Consistent with the theory described above in Section II.A, the rule of
automatic reversal caused second-generation courts to narrow the definition of
"bias" from the expansive definition given by the Court in Murchison.3' Del
Vecchio v. Illinois Department of Corrections is the leading second-generation case
that illustrates the pernicious effects of automatic reversal.32
As a young man, George Del Vecchio committed a horrible murder that
made headlines across Chicago. A prosecutor, Louis Garippo, cut him a break,33
and as a result of Garippo's decision Del Vecchio did not spend his life in
prison; instead, he was a free man eight years later. Four years after his release,
Del Vecchio murdered a child. At his murder trial, his judge was Louis
Garippo, the same man who had helped him obtain a lenient sentence twelve
years before. The evidence of Del Vecchio's guilt at his second trial was
"overwhelming";34 the jury convicted him and sentenced him to death.31
The question presented to the Seventh Circuit on Del Vecchio's habeas
petition was whether Judge Garippo was biased. Murchison suggests that the
answer to that question was "yes." After all, might not Garippo have been
tempted to act with the "zeal of a prosecutor," as the Court noted in
Murchison ?36 Faced with similar circumstances, other judges had recused
themselves voluntarily,37 and some states had reversed convictions of
defendants whose judges refused to do so.f8 The Seventh Circuit, however, did
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 & n.2 (2006) (describing a biased
trial judge as rendering the trial "fundamentally unfair" or "inherently unreliable"); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (holding that a biased judge makes the trial "fundamentally
unfair").
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
31 F.3d 1363 (7 th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 1368.
34. Id. at 1369.
Id.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).
E.g., United States v. Zerilli, 328 F. Supp. 706 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
E.g., Mustafoski v. State, 867 P.2d 824, 836 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994); People v. Corelli, 343
N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973). The majority rule, however, is that judges are not
disqualified from presiding over criminal trials merely on the ground that they have
previously prosecuted the defendants in unrelated criminal proceedings. See Jay M. Zitter,
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not read Murchison so broadly. The Seventh Circuit summarized Murchison and
the other early bias cases as follows: "In each of these [early Supreme Court]
cases, it is fair to say that the influences involved struck at the heart of human
motivation, that an average man would find it difficult, if not impossible, to set
the influence aside.
39
That was an aggressive reading of the Court's first-generation precedents.
After all, in one case the judge's "motivation" was merely five dollars. 4' Nor
did the Seventh Circuit take seriously Murchison's first-generation emphasis on
the "appearance of bias. '41 Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that the Supreme
Court "simply uses the 'appearance of justice' language to make the point that
judges sometimes must recuse themselves when they face possible temptations
to be biased, even when they exhibit no actual bias against a party or a cause. In
short, bad appearances alone do not require disqualification.
42
The Seventh Circuit was not alone in its decision to restrict the Court's
first-generation decisions to their facts. Three other second-generation
appellate courts had faced this issue and decided that no error had occurred.
43
The court sustained Del Vecchio's conviction and his death sentence.
If the Seventh Circuit had applied the Chapman test for harmless error and
asked whether the judge's previous interaction with the defendant had
"contribute[d] to the verdict obtained,"'  it would almost certainly have
concluded that the judge's failure to recuse himself was harmless. After all, the
jury found guilt and passed the death sentence; all the judge did was preside
over the trial. With the transcript available, the habeas court could have
reviewed the judge's rulings for any favoritism. Had the habeas court been able
to review Judge Garippo's bias for harmless error, it might have held both that
Garippo should have recused himself-indeed, that he had a constitutional
duty to recuse himself- but that his failure to live up to his duty was,
Sitting or Acting in Criminal Case, 85 A.L.R. 5th 471, 510 (2001) (collecting cases); see also
Peter M. Friedman, Comment, Don't I Know You from Somewhere?: Why Due Process Should
Bar Judges from Presiding over Cases when They Have Previously Prosecuted the Defendant, 88 J.
CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 683 (1998) (collecting and lamenting second-generation cases that
agree with Del Vecchio).
39. Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1373.
40. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 246 (1977).
41. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
42. Del Vecchio, 31 F. 3d at 1372.
43. Id. at 1375-77 (citing Corbett v. Bordenkircher, 615 F.2d 722, 723-24 (6th Cir. 198o); Barry v.
United States, 528 F.zd 1094 (7th Cir. 1976); Murphy v. Beto, 416 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.
1969)).
44. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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nevertheless, harmless because it did not affect the jury's verdict or sentence.
But the Seventh Circuit could not do this; its only option for affirming Del
Vecchio's conviction was to narrow the meaning of "bias."
Del Vecchio's restricted definition of "bias" was the central issue in the
subsequent habeas petition of William Bracy and Roger Collins, two men
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Illinois state court in 1982.4"
Twelve years after Bracy and Collins's trial, their judge, Thomas Maloney, was
convicted of taking bribes to influence the outcomes of other criminal cases.
Bracy and Collins, who had not paid any bribes, filed habeas petitions in
federal court claiming that the judge had been hard on them in order to conceal
his favoritism toward other defendants. 46 Bracy and Collins had no evidence to
support that claim aside from Maloney's general pattern of ruling for the
prosecution except when bribed. Their habeas petition requested discovery on
their claim of bias.
47
The district court denied that discovery request, citing Del Vecchio to hold
that Bracy and Collins had not alleged any bias. 48 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed, 49 also relying on Del Vecchio's narrowed definition of bias: "[F]or
bias to be an automatic ground for the reversal of a criminal conviction the
defendant must show either the actuality, rather than just the appearance, of
judicial bias, 'or a possible temptation so severe that we might presume an
actual, substantial incentive to be biased.'
s
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit's denial of
discovery, s and on remand Bracy and Collins's lawyers at last examined
Maloney on the stand. The former judge vehemently denied taking any bribes
or showing any bias,s2 and the petitioners' other discovery requests also "drew
a blank." 3 After all the discovery was finished, the district court again faced
4S. See People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1985).
46. United States ex rel. Collins v. Welborn (Collins 1), 868 F. Supp. 950, 990 (N.D. Ill. 1994),
affd sub nom. Bracy v. Gramley (Bracy 1), 81 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 899
(1997) (Bracy II).
47. Collins I, 868 F. Supp. at 969.
48. Id. at 991.
49. BracyI, 81 F.3d 684.
50. Id. at 688 (quoting Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 138o (7th Cit. 1994) (en
banc)).
51. Bracy II, 520 U.S. 899.
52. United States ex rel. Collins v. Welborn (Collins 11), 79 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
S3. Bracy v. Schomig (Bracy III), 286 F. 3d 406, 422 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Collins 11, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (finding that
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
essentially the same dilemma it had faced five years before; and in the
meantime another Seventh Circuit decision had reaffirmed Del Vecchio's
narrow definition of bias. 4 The district court was in a difficult position-the
meaning of bias had become so restricted that the court, on these facts, could
not find that Maloney had been biased, even though it seemed that Maloney's
questionable rulings during the sentencing hearing may have led the jury to
condemn Bracy and Collins to death. During the penalty phase of their trial,
Maloney markedly favored the prosecution."5 As the Seventh Circuit would
later put it, "[i]f the death penalty hearing had been scripted, it could not have
been more damaging to Bracy and Collins.",
6
What the district court wished to do was precisely what the doctrine of
automatic reversal forbade it from doing. The district court wished to say: of
course Maloney had an interest in punishing these petitioners. But upon
examining the trial record, the court could confidently find that Maloney's bias
had no effect on the jury's verdict of guilt -precisely the examination called for
by the Chapman test for harmless error. Only during the sentencing phase, in
which Maloney's discretionary rulings were much more questionable and
much more devastating to the petitioners, could the court conclude that
Maloney's bias might have contributed to the outcome.
And that was precisely what the district court did. Defying common
sense," the court held that Maloney was unbiased during the guilt phase of
Bracy and Collins's trial, but then (days later) "actually" biased during the
sentencing phase. s8
it could not "be assumed [that Maloney] was always, or even usually, motivated by his
pecuniary and/or penal interests when exhibiting his prosecution-oriented tendencies").
54. Cartalino v. Washington, 122 F.3d 8, 11 ( 7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.) (applying Del Vecchio's
restricted definition of "bias" but remanding for further proceedings because the petitioner
had presented evidence that his judge accepted a bribe to convict him).
ss. Maloney erroneously permitted the prosecution to introduce, as aggravating evidence, other
crimes of which Bracy had been accused but not yet convicted. Bracy III, 286 F.3d at 416-17
(plurality opinion). He refused to allow Bracy's lawyer time to prepare an argument against
admitting this evidence, and he refused to allow Collins to sever his own sentencing so as to
avoid prejudice to him from the evidence of Bracy's previous misdeeds. Id. at 416. Maloney
was unconcerned about the defense's failure to introduce any mitigating evidence, and he
even tried to dissuade Bracy's lawyer from making a closing argument. Id. at 417.
S6. Id. at 415.
S. Id. at 419 (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting) ("To reverse [the death sentences] while
upholding the convictions is an unprincipled splitting of the difference, rather than legal
justice."); id. at 432 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The rationale
for confining the finding of bias to the capital phase of the trial... remains elusive.").
58. Id. at 411 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e will focus today on actual bias."); id. at 419 (finding
that Maloney was biased during the sentencing phase).
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A divided en banc panel upheld that decision over strong dissents.5 9 Only
four of the eleven judges on the panel agreed with the district court that
Maloney was unbiased during the guilt phase and then biased at the penalty
phase; the other judges would have either denied all of petitioners' claims or
granted them all. 6" Despite the plurality's insistence that it was obeying the
doctrine of automatic reversal, 6' the dissents are correct that the plurality only
reached its result by defying both that rule and any common-sense
understanding of the meaning of bias.
The Due Process Clause's protections against judicial bias remain a mess.
The federal courts continue to overrule, on habeas, the states' sensible attempts
to evaluate judicial bias using harmless-error review,62 while sustaining death
sentences imposed by judges with strong personal antipathies toward the
defendants. A good example of such a third-generation case is Wright v.
Cowan,61 a habeas case controlled by Del Vecchio. Patrick Wright was convicted
of rape, murder, and attempted murder before Judge Paul Komada, an Illinois
state judge acquainted with one of Wright's victims. Wright was only free to
commit those crimes because four years earlier, then-prosecutor Komada
agreed to a generous plea bargain. In Del Vecchio, Judge Garippo merely
presided over the jury's sentencing decision; here, by contrast, Judge Komada
himself condemned Wright to death. Nevertheless, the federal court found no
sg. Id. at 419-20 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Three judges thought the conviction and sentence were both valid and would deny the writ
altogether. See id. at 426 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Four judges
thought the conviction and the sentence were both flawed and that the writ should issue as
to both. See id. at 426 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 415 ("We should not be misunderstood to be saying that rulings at the guilt phase are
subject to a harmless error analysis, whereas in the penalty phase they are not.").
62. The Seventh Circuit again provides a good example. In 1991, Wisconsin's appellate court
decided State v. Rochelt, 477 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), in which a trial judge had
written a letter to a state police instructor, imploring him to release two officers to testify in
a criminal trial that the judge was about to conduct. Id. at 661-62. The judge's letter showed
that he had likely prejudged the officers' credibility and possibly believed that the
defendants before him were guilty. Though condemning the letter and lamenting that the
letter "raises a reasonable question regarding the judge's impartiality," the appellate court
nevertheless concluded that in this particular case, the judge presided over a fair trial. Id. at
662. The Seventh Circuit overruled Rochelt's sensible rule in Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398
F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2005), a case in which Franklin's trial judge in Wisconsin state court wrote
a memorandum to the state's appellate courts in which he discussed the facts of Franklin's
case. That memorandum suggested that the judge had made up his mind that Franklin was
guilty, but there was no indication that the judge's state of mind actually contributed to the
jury's verdict.
63. 149 F. Supp. 2d523, 540-41 (C.D. I11. 2001).
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bias. 6' This state of affairs may be due to the rule of automatic reversal, which
places second-generation courts, like the Del Vecchio panel, in the difficult
position of choosing between affirming the verdict in the particular case on the
one hand, and sustaining a robust definition of "bias" for future cases on the
other.
C. The Diminished Right to Conflict-Free Counsel
The narrowing effect of the rule of automatic reversal is also apparent in
the history of the right to conflict-free counsel. The Supreme Court first
established this right in its 1942 decision Glasser v. United States;6, the Glasser
Court held that if the right is violated, then the conviction must be reversed
automatically.
66
Glasser established that a criminal defendant has a right to conflict-free
counsel, but did not specify how that right should be guaranteed. One reading
of Glasser is that the right only applies if the defendant realizes that his lawyer
has a conflict of interest and raises an objection. This was the Court's
interpretation in its 1978 decision Holloway v. Arkansas.6' Another reading of
Glasser, however, is that the trial judge has an affirmative duty to be alert to
possible conflicts and to draw the defendant's attention to them whenever the
judge "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists."68
Two years after Holloway, the Court suggested this affirmative duty in dicta in
Cuyler v. Sullivan6 ' and a year later applied that dictum in Wood v. Georgia,
where the Court held that in some cases the Sixth Amendment requires a trial
judge to take affirmative steps to prevent defense counsel's conflicts of
64. Id. at 537-38. Instead, the court granted Wright's habeas petition on the ground that
Komada had failed to consider certain mitigating evidence. Id.
65. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
66. Id. at 75-76.
67. 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978) ("[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation
over timely objection reversal is automatic." (emphasis added)).
68. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (198o).
69. Id. The Sullivan Court did not reverse, however, because "[n]othing in the circumstances of
this case indicates that the trial court had a duty to inquire whether there was a conflict of
interest." Id. Because the trial judge neither knew nor could be expected to know of the
conflict, Sullivan held that reversal would only be required if "an actual conflict of interest
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interest.7° By 1981, then, the Court's first-generation precedents had
established the trial judge's affirmative duty to inquire into conflicts of interest
whenever the judge knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists.
In its 2002 decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the Court ended the experiment
with a trial judge's affirmative duty to inquire into potential conflicts of
interest." A five-Justice majority held that the Sixth Amendment is violated
only if "defense counsel is forced [by the trial court] to represent codefendants
over his timely objection. '72 Two dissenting Justices in Mickens read Holloway,
Sullivan, and Wood to place an affirmative duty on the trial judge to prevent
conflicts of interest even if the defense lawyer makes no express objection.
73
What the Mickens dissents failed to acknowledge, however, is that the
second-generation cases decided after Wood had already narrowed the scope of
the right. A close reading of those second-generation decisions shows that the
rule of automatic reversal caused the lower courts to first reduce and then all
but eliminate the trial judge's affirmative duty to prevent conflicts- long before
the Mickens majority formally abolished the duty in 2002.
After Wood was decided in 1981, the first of the second-generation appeals
were brought by defendants who had ignored their trial judges' advice and
retained their counsel despite the counsel's conflict of interest. On direct
appeal, these defendants claimed that their judges had not inquired closely
enough into the conflict or else had not "personally advise[d]" them of their
rights.74 The appellate courts refused to reverse these cases, reasoning that the
70. 450 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1981) ("Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to
make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists.'" (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347)). The Wood Court granted certiorari on the
question of whether Georgia's antipornography statute violated the Due Process Clause, but
vacated the defendants' convictions on another ground entirely, namely that their lawyer's
salary was paid by their employer, who was less interested in acquittal than in securing a
ruling that this troublesome statute was unconstitutional. Wood, 450 U.S. at 273. The Court
remanded for further hearings on the issue of conflict because "the possibility of a conflict of
interest was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon the
court a duty to inquire further." Id. at 272.
71. 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
72. Id. at 168.
73. Id. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 19o (Souter, J., dissenting).
74. FED. R CRiM. P. 44. This rule requires the trial judge, in any case in which one lawyer
represents two or more defendants, to "personally advise each defendant of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel." The rule was approved shortly after Holloway and was meant
to prevent conflicts of interest. Id. advisory committee's note. The rule does not require
automatic reversal; the Advisory Committee note explains that "[t]he failure in a particular
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trial judges had done a good enough job.7' This was the first step toward
weakening the affirmative duty that the Court created in Wood.
Based on those decisions, later appellate courts refused to reverse even
when trial courts had failed to make any inquiry whatsoever into conflicts of
interest.76 The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits went so far as to imply that a
trial judge's failure to inquire could never be an independent cause for
reversal.77 The First and Second Circuits did more for defendants: these
circuits remanded some cases for new evidentiary hearings to determine
whether an actual conflict of interest had existed at the trial. 78 (Although that is
case to conduct a Rule 44(c) inquiry would not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal of a
conviction of a jointly represented defendant." Id.
75. E.g., United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d loo6, 1012-13 ( 9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the trial court's hearing was sufficient even though the court did not "personally advise" the
defendants); United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 62o, 627 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the trial court's hearing was adequate to advise defendants of their lawyers' potential
conflict); United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d 1255, 1258 (Sth Cir. 1982) (holding that the
trial court's hearing regarding defense counsel's conflict of interest was sufficient to avoid
reversal, even though the court "did not 'personally advise' either appellant of his rights as
required by [Rule 44(c)]").
76. E.g., United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 791 (loth Cir. 1985) ("Although we do not
condone the trial court's failure to make the Rule 44(c) inquiry, we agree with those
decisions concluding that the failure alone is not sufficient grounds for reversal."); United
States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1326 (1ith Cir. 1983) (refusing to reverse even after the judge
admitted her failure to conduct a "probing inquiry" into a potential conflict of interest,
because "that error will not require reversal"); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205
(4 th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he mere failure of the district court to inquire and advise as required by
[Rule] 44(c) does not make necessary a reversal.").
77. See, e.g., Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (refusing to reverse
because the defendant could not prove on appeal that "the trial judge knew of any potential
conflict of interest"); United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 1994) (excusing the
trial judge's decision not to inquire into potential conflicts because "the trial court's reliance
on defense counsel's own assessment regarding the potential for conflict was entirely
reasonable"); United States v. Holley, 826 F.2d 331, 334 (sth Cir. 1987) (refusing to reverse
even though the trial court failed to inquire because the defendant "has not shown an actual
conflict of interest"); Wilson v. Morris, 724 F.2d 591, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(refusing to reverse when the trial judge failed to inquire into joint representation, and
implying that an appellate court should only reverse when proof of "actual conflict" appears
on the record).
78. E.g., United States v. Jiang, 14o F.3d 124 (2d Cit. 1998) (remanding for an evidentiary
hearing); Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to find any lapse of
duty when the trial judge failed to inquire into a conflict of interest and instead remanding
for a hearing on the issue of actual conflict); Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d lo (1st Cir.
1982) (refusing to reverse because a federal .habeas hearing would suffice to determine
whether an actual conflict existed). Early decisions of the Seventh and Sixth Circuits also
followed this practice. E.g., United States ex rel. Ballard v. Bengston, 702 F.2d 6S6, 664 (7th
1198
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a better solution than nothing, it is not as effective as the trial judge addressing
the problem before or during the trial itself.) In those few cases in which an
appellate court did reverse on the ground that the trial judge failed in her duty
to inquire, the defendants' lawyers either objected on the record 79 or else
labored under conflicts of interest that were so egregious and clear that their
clients could prove, on appeal, that an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected their performancesSo (Although such reversals were defense victories,
these few victors had to carry a near-impossible burden;s" had the appellate
courts instead applied the Chapman standard, the prosecution would have had to
shoulder the burden of proving that the judge's failure to inquire was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.) In no case did an appellate court reverse solely
because the judge failed to carry out her affirmative duty to inquire.
Simply put, the second-generation courts reversed only those convictions
in which the trial judge ignored the defendant's express objection or in which
the trial transcript revealed an obvious, actual conflict that adversely affected
the lawyer's performance in the courtroom. The affirmative duty established by
the first-generation decision, Wood, vanished almost as soon as it appeared.
One reason for that disappearance was the rule of automatic reversal.
Because of that rule, the second-generation appellate courts could only
maintain Wood's affirmative duty if at the same time they reversed the
Cir. 1983) (refusing to reverse even though the trial judge had brusquely refused to grant a
continuance or to appoint new counsel, and instead remanding for a new hearing on
whether "the prospect of dilatory practices" justified the judge's decision); United States v.
Taylor, 657 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1981) (remanding for further hearing on whether an actual
conflict existed).
79. E.g., United States v. Rogers, 209 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing when the trial court
ignored the defendant's express objection to the court's decision to appoint a police
commissioner as his lawyer); Selsor v. Kaiser, 81 F.3d 1492 (loth Cir. 1996) ("Where there
is both a timely objection and the trial court fails to appoint separate counsel or to inquire
adequately into the possibility of a conflict of interest, the reversal will be automatic.");
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388 (loth Cir. 1995) (same); Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d
ioo6 (ith Cir. 1992) (same).
8o. Campbell v. Rice, 265 F.3d 878, 884-85, 888 ( 9th Cir. 2001); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d
296, 302, 304-06 (2d Cir. 1995). In both cases, the transcript of the trial revealed that the
defense lawyer had an obvious conflict: in Campbell, the defendant's lawyer was under
indictment by the prosecutor's office; in Ciak, the defendant's lawyer had represented key
prosecution witnesses in prior cases and his cross-examination was obviously flawed as a
result. In United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 154-59 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit
reversed because an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance, but refused to
find that the district court had breached its duty to inquire.
s1. To show a Sixth Amendment violation, the defendant must prove that "an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348
(1980).
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conviction. In cases in which the trial court's failure to inquire was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, a reversal would have seemed a windfall for the
defendant and a waste of judicial resources.
The difficult position of the second-generation courts is illustrated by
United States v. Mers, a fairly straightforward drug case in which Herman Mers
and his son Lester sold two thousand pounds of marijuana to DEA agents.82
Two other men stood guard with guns while the marijuana changed hands. At
trial, the Merses admitted the sale and all the taped conversations leading up to
it, but claimed that the DEA agents had entrapped them. The two guards had a
different defense: they knew nothing of the drugs and instead thought they
were guarding a truck of valuable antiques. All four men were defended by the
same lawyer; all four were convicted.
The trial judge did anticipate that a conflict might arise, and she did ask the
guards whether they agreed to proceed with just one lawyer (they did).
Unfortunately, the judge did not fully explain to them the precise nature of the
conflict that would arise and did not specifically advise them that they had a
right to their own lawyers.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the two guards claimed that a conflict of
interest had adversely affected their trial: their lawyer had spent too much time
on the Mers's entrapment defense and not enough energy on their claim that
they knew nothing about the drugs. The appellate panel was not persuaded;
the court concluded that no other strategy had been "realistically available" to
the guards' lawyer. 8, All four men had been caught red-handed; the Mers's
only chance was to plead entrapment; the guards' only chance was to plead
ignorance of the drugs in the truck. Unlike the Supreme Court decisions in
Glasser and Holloway, here there was no realistic chance that a defense lawyer
could win the case by shifting blame between the defendants. Quite the
contrary: a "united front" defense was obviously "the best strategy available."8 4
Should the Eleventh Circuit have reversed these convictions, despite the
near-certainty that the outcomes would have been the same had the guards
hired their own lawyer? Surely not; the panel was correct that "[i]t would be
the height of formalism to reverse a conviction because of literal
noncompliance with a procedural rule when the evil that the rule has been
designed to prevent has never occurred.
8 ,
82. 701 F.2d 1321 (ith Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 1331.
84. Id. at 1329 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 1326.
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The rule of automatic reversal prevented second-generation courts like
Mers from both affirming valid convictions and also repeating clearly and
forcefully what Wood had held the Sixth Amendment to require. Again and
again, the second-generation courts chose to diminish the scope of the right
rather than reverse a conviction in which the error did not contribute to the
verdict. Rather than embrace the Wood Court's decision to read an affirmative
duty into the Sixth Amendment, the second-generation courts instead tolerated
trial judges' failures as constitutional. Each such decision was one more
precedent limiting the affirmative duty created by Wood, until eventually that
duty was all but gone.
By diminishing the scope of the right, these second-generation cases made
it harder for defendants to win third-generation cases. One example of such a
case may be United States ex rel. Smith v. Hardy-Hall.86 Smith and another man
were convicted of armed robbery on the strength of victims' eyewitness
identification. Their lawyer never raised a formal objection with the trial judge
regarding any potential conflict. The district court denied Smith's habeas
petition because "the record does not show that an objection to multiple
representation was made" and because no actual conflict appeared on the
record.8' Had the trial court inquired into the matter at trial, as the Supreme
Court once held that the Sixth Amendment required, the case might have come
out differently. Cases like Smith demonstrate that even before Mickens formally
abolished trial judges' duty to inquire into potential conflicts of interest,
second-generation cases had already eliminated that duty.
D. The Confused Meaning of "Reasonable Doubt"
The rule of automatic reversal has also diminished a defendant's right to a
jury instruction on the meaning of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." That
right is secured by the Due Process Clause,"8 but the scope of the right is
uncertain: what, precisely, must the judge tell the jury about reasonable doubt?
To that crucial question, the appellate courts have given what Professor Robert
Power calls a "crazy quilt" 9 of answers: two circuits and several states
86. No. 94-6973, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3714 (N.D. I11. Mar. 27, 1996). The opinion is cursory:
its brief discussion does not provide enough detail even to guess whether joint
representation harmed the defendants' chances. Their state appeals were never published.
87. Id. at *1o.
88. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478, 490 (1978) (recognizing a right to a jury instruction on the presumption of innocence).
89. Robert C. Power, Reasonable and Other Doubts: The Problem ofJury Instructions, 67 TENN. L.
REV. 45,47 (1999).
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recommend that trial judges say nothing at all besides the bare words "beyond
a reasonable doubt";9" most federal judges instruct jurors to compare their
deliberations to important decisions they might make in their personal lives; 9'
many state judges follow the recommendation of the Federal Judicial Center
and instruct jurors to convict only if they are "firmly convinced" of the
defendant's guilt; 92 and a few states continue to permit their judges to describe
the standard as "moral certainty" of guilt.93 These differences are surprising
because the Due Process Clause ought, in theory, to provide only one standard.
One reason for the courts' failure to converge on a single definition of
reasonable doubt is the Supreme Court's decision, in the 1993 case of Sullivan
v. Louisiana, to apply the rule of automatic reversal to all faulty reasonable
doubt instructions. 94 Since then, most appellate courts, including the Supreme
Court itself, have narrowed the scope of the right to the facts of Sullivan and its
precursor, Cage v. Lousiana.9s In other words, defendants have the right to a
jury instruction that is slighdy better than the instruction given in Sullivan;
they do not have the right to any specific, accurate instruction. Any number of
flawed instructions are thus affirmed as constitutional, so long as they are
worded differently from the instruction at issue in Sullivan.
go. See Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical
Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677, 682-88 (1995). Both the Fourth Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit recommend that the trial judge not explain the meaning of "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d 629, 635 (4 th Cir. 2004); Pattern Criminal
Federal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit § 2.04 (1998), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf. Early Supreme Court decisions established that the
Constitution requires no further explanation of the standard. See Holland v. United States,
348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) ("Attempts to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually
result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury." (quoting Miles v. United States, 103
U.S. 304, 312 (188o))); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887).
91. Power, supra note 89, at 72-81 (describing this approach as "dominant" in the federal
courts).
92. E.g., State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, 314 (Utah 2005) (exercising supervisory authority to
require Utah trial courts to use the Federal Judicial Center instruction). Justice Ginsburg has
recommended that courts adopt the Federal Judicial Center instruction. Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93. E.g., Calhoun v. State, 932 So. 2d 923, 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (affirming a conviction
based on an instruction that described the standard as "moral certainty"); Commonwealth
v. Lebron, 845 N.E.2d 12o6, 12o8 n.i (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (recommending that trial
judges instruct the jury to acquit the defendant only if "they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge").
94- 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
95. 498 U.S. 39 (199o). Sullivan did not restate the precise instruction given. Instead, Sullivan
noted that the instruction given there was "essentially identical" to the instruction described
in Cage. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277.
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Just one year after deciding Sullivan, the Court dramatically narrowed the
scope of the right in Victor v. Nebraska. 6 In Victor and its companion case, the
trial judges gave instructions tainted by many of the same confusing phrases
present in Cage and Sullivan -phrases like "moral certainty," 97 "possible
doubt,", 8 and "substantial doubt,"99 along with additional confusing phrases
not considered before, such as "moral evidence."' ° At best, these phrases are
obsolete, repeated from a jury instruction given in 185o;1°1 at worst, they
suggest that jurors may find guilt based on their "moral" conclusions or may
demand that the defendant come forward with a "substantial" reason for them
to doubt the prosecution. The better result would have been for the Victor
Court to ban these phrases from instructions altogether by holding them to be
error.
The rule of automatic reversal prevented that holding. If not for the rule of
automatic reversal, the Victor Court could have both condemned the
problematic phrases and also found that error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The facts of Victor strongly suggest that the confusing phrases were
harmless: first, these phrases were surrounded by other language that better
explained the prosecution's burden of proof;" 2 and second, the evidence
against defendants was overwhelming and unrebutted.' °3 But the rule of
automatic reversal foreclosed that option: the Court could not both condemn
the problematic phrases as unconstitutional and also affirm the convictions.
Since Victor, the Court has not again considered the constitutionality of
jury instructions on reasonable doubt. Some state appellate courts have used
their supervisory authority to require trial judges to give specific, improved
instructions. 0 4 Other courts, however, continue to approve the erroneous
96. 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
97. Compare id. at 7, 18, with Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
98. Compare Victor, 511 U.S. at 7, 18, with Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.
99. Compare Victor, 511 U.S. at 18, with Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
ioo. Victor, 511 U.S. at 7.
101. In 185o, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined
the reasonable doubt standard using the phrases "moral certainty" and "moral evidence."
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Mass. 295, 320 (185o). His definition was copied in many
other states. See also Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the
Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 516-19 (1975).
102. Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 21-22.
103. See People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 867-69 (Cal. 1992); State v. Victor, 457 N.W.2d 431,
436-39 (Neb. 199o).
104. See, e.g., State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (Ariz. 1995) (exercising supervisory authority to
order future trial courts to use the Federal Judicial Center instruction); Ruffin v. State, 906
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phrases that the Court condemned in Cage and Sullivan.s05 As Professor Power
has noted, Victor encouraged trial judges to "say everything" -that is, to "give
every instruction ever approved by the appellate courts- the more the better -
because appellate courts will treat such accurate language as antibodies that
surround erroneous statements and render them harmless.""' 6 If not for the
rule of automatic reversal, the Victor Court could have labeled the "erroneous
statements" for what they were-error-and yet still affirmed the valid
convictions.
E. Responses to Objections
This Part has suggested that the rule of automatic reversal causes second-
generation appellate courts to diminish the scope of rights protected by the
rule. To be sure, there are other explanations for this trend. The rule of
automatic reversal is not the only cause.
One alternative explanation is that the courts have simply become less
friendly to defendants' appeals. Professor Cass Sunstein's recent research
shows that appellate judges' rulings in appeals from administrative agencies
vary depending on their political ideology." 7 Strikingly, however, Sunstein's
findings show no correlation between appellate judges' political preferences
and their rulings in criminal cases.' 8 And even in state death penalty cases-
long considered one of the most politically charged and least neutral areas of
appellate law °9- empirical investigations have shown no correlation between
A.2d 360, 371 (Md. 20o6) (reversing conviction because the trial judge failed to give the
Maryland pattern instruction on reasonable doubt); State v. Reyes, 116 P.3 d 305, 314 (Utah
2005) (exercising supervisory authority to order future trial courts to use the Federal Judicial
Center instruction).
1o5. E.g., Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F. 3d 1541, 1545-47 (i1th Cir. 1995) (approving a reasonable doubt
instruction that contained thirty-one sentences and paraphrased different legal conceptions
of the standard); State v. Velasco, 751 A.2d 8oo, 822 (Conn. 2000) (approving an instruction
defining reasonable doubt as "a real doubt, an honest doubt"); Commonwealth v. Painten,
709 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Mass. 1999) (approving instructions that told the jury that "the
evidence must convince you of the defendant's guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty");
Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 638 N.E.2d 20, 23-25 (Mass. 1994) (approving long,
contradictory instructions).
io6. Power, supra note 89, at 97.
107. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRuCAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 24-38 (2006).
io8. Id. at 48-50.
iog. See generally Gerald F. Uelmen, Elected Judiciary, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 864, 865 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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judges' political elections and their rulings. '° To be sure, political preferences
do not always correlate with judges' attitudes toward defendants' rights. Yet
Professor Sunstein's results suggest that changes in judicial personnel are not
the only reason for the diminishing scope of the rights described above.
Indeed, even the current conservative Supreme Court continues to reaffirm and
even expand important trial rights of defendants, as illustrated by Crawford v.
Washington (which expanded defendants' rights under the Confrontation
Clause),"' United States v. Booker (which expanded defendants' jury trial rights
under the Sixth Amendment)," 2 and Holmes v. South Carolina (which
reaffirmed defendants' right to present evidence of third-party guilt).13
III. A NEW DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR CLASSIFYING ERROR
Because the rule of automatic reversal encourages appellate courts to
narrow the definition of errors protected by the rule, courts should reform the
current doctrinal framework for determining whether an error triggers
automatic reversal. Section III.A describes the current framework and scholarly
critiques of it. Section III.B proposes a new framework that would avoid the
doctrinal consequences described above in Part II.
A. Arizona v. Fulminante: The Current Frameworkfor Applying Automatic
Reversal
In its 1991 decision inArizona v. Fulminante,14 the Supreme Court created a
framework for determining which errors require automatic reversal. The
Fulminante Court divided procedural errors into two categories: "structural
errors," which require automatic reversal, and "trial errors," which do not
require reversal if the prosecution proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.""' After
Fulminante, a federal appellate court faced with a new type of error must decide
whether the type of error is a "structural error," in which case the court must
reverse automatically, or whether it is instead a "trial error," in which case the
11o. John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection:
An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1999).
111. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
112. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
113. 547 U.S. 319 (20o6).
114. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
115. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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court may affirm the conviction if the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Fulminante provided three tests to determine whether a given type of error is a
"structural error": if the type of error "affect[s] the framework within which
the trial proceeds";"16 if its effect on the verdict cannot "be quantitatively
assessed" on appeal;" 7 or if it does not occur "during the presentation of the
case to the jury.""' In recent opinions the Court has applied a fourth test for
structural error: if the type of error "necessarily render[s] a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence," " 9 then the type of error is structural and must be reversed
automatically.
Professor David McCord has persuasively criticized the Fulminante test for
being vague and difficult to apply to as-yet-unclassified types of error.'20 He is
correct: even today, sixteen years after Fulminante, it is still unclear whether
certain types of error are properly considered structural errors or trial errors.
For example, is the government's failure to charge an element of the offense in
the indictment a structural error? The circuits are split on the issue,'2' in large
part because Fulminante does not give a clear answer. On the one hand,
Fulminante suggests that this type of error is structural because it does not
occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury"" and because it does
not seem possible to "quantitatively assess[]" this type of error on appeal.' 3
But on the other hand, Fulminante suggests that this type of error is not
structural because it does not always affect the "framework" of the trial' 14 and
because it does not "necessarily" render the trial "fundamentally unfair" or "an
116. 499 U.S. at 310.
117. Id. at 308.
118. Id. at 307.
iig. E.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)).
120. David McCord, The "Trial"/"Structural"Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1401, 1416-24 (1997) (describing errors that are hard to classify using the
Fulminante framework).
121. Compare United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 118o-81 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v.
Spinner, i8o F.3d 514, 515-16 (3 d Cir. 1999), with United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 943-
4 5 (8th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 285-86 (sth Cir. 2004). See
generally United States v. Omer, 429 F.3d 835, 836, 841-42 (9 th Cir. 2005) (Graber, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (describing the circuit split).
122. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307.
123. Id. at 307-08.
124. Id. at 31o.
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unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence."' 25 For example, if the
defendant knew that the government had to prove a particular element of the
crime, and if he prepared his defense accordingly, then the government's
failure to include that element in the indictment would not alter the
"framework" of the trial, and would not make the trial "unfair."
Scholars have also criticized the Fulminante framework on the ground that
it does not accurately describe some errors that the Court has held to be
structural. While some of the errors now labeled as structural are related to the
"framework" of the trial or render the trial "unreliable" or "unfair," that is not
true of all structural errors. Some structural errors simply do not contribute to
the verdict in any discernible way. Instead, as Professors Tom Stacy and Kim
Dayton have pointed out, these errors violate other rights that are entirely
separate from the right to an accurate trial.12
6
Consider, for instance, the right to a public trial. The Court has held that a
violation of this right is a structural error requiring automatic reversal.'27 But it
is hard to see what a trial's publicity has to do with its reliability or its
fundamental fairness. After all, judges sometimes do close trials to the public
when they have a good reason to do so-usually, to protect the privacy or
safety of witnesses2 8 It is difficult to believe that trials closed for a bad
reason'29 are unreliable and that trials closed for a good reason'3° are reliable.
Instead, the denial of this right implicates the distinct value of transparency, a
value that is balanced against the competing values of witnesses' safety and
privacy. The Court may be right to treat the denial of a public trial as a
125. Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 9 (1999)).
126. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 11, at 94-95.
127. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984) ("[A] defendant should not be required to prove
specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee.").
128. See, e.g., Sevencan v. Herbert, 342 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the closure of the
courtroom during the testimony of undercover agents was appropriate because the agents'
undercover work was ongoing); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 165-68 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (holding that the right to a public trial is not absolute and that a trial judge may close
the court to the public during the testimony of child victims of sex offenses).
129. E.g., Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 (disapproving the Georgia court's decision to close a seven-day
suppression hearing based on the government's concern that two hours of evidence might
disclose details of ongoing investigations).
130. E.g., Bell, 236 F.3d at 167-68 ("'[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor' victim of sex crimes, including protecting them from further trauma and
embarrassment, is precisely the type of compelling interest that can overcome the
presumption in favor of an open trial." (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982))).
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structural error requiring automatic reversal -but if so, Fulminante does not
explain why.
Or consider the error of race discrimination in the selection of a grand jury.
Under the Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Hillery,3' a defendant's conviction must
be reversed automatically if the grand jury that indicted him systematically
excluded jurors of a particular race. It is of no importance that the grand jury
had enough evidence to indict or that a properly selected trial jury later
convicted the defendant after a fair trial. The value that automatic reversal
enforces in a case like Hillery has little if anything to do with the reliability of
the ultimate verdict; it has more to do with the value of antidiscrimination in
the criminal process.
Or consider the right, established in Faretta v. California,'32 of a criminal
defendant to represent himself. Many trials of self-representing innocent
defendants would be more reliable if the court forced those defendants to
accept representation by a competent lawyer. But the right to self-
representation has little to do with the verdict's reliability; the right is instead
grounded in the defendant's autonomy and dignity.'
In short, scholars have persuasively criticized Fulminante on two fronts:
first, the Fulminante framework is vague and thus cannot determine whether a
new type of error is structural; second, the Fulminante framework does not
account for several types of error that the Court has held to be structural.
However, scholars' proposed solutions to these problems are unsatisfactory.
Professors Stacy and Dayton propose a new framework that would result in
broader application of the rule of automatic reversal. For example, they suggest
reversing automatically whenever a new trial can "correct the damage
constitutional error has wrought,""3 or whenever automatic reversal would
create "disincentives sufficient enough to deter constitutional violations." 3 '
Professor McCord, by contrast, proposes eight factors courts should consider
in deciding whether to reverse a given error.' 6 In practice, it appears that his
eight-factor test would effectively broaden automatic reversal by requiring
131. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
132. 422 U.S. 8o6 (1975); see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (noting that
this error cannot ever be harmless and thus requires automatic reversal).
133. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 16o (2000) (stating that the right to self-
representation is "grounded in part in a respect for individual autonomy"); Wiggins, 465
U.S. at 178 ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the accused's dignity and
autonomy.").
134. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 11, at 95.
13S. Id. at 97.
136. McCord, supra note 120, at 1454-58.
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appellate courts to reverse whenever the constitutional right is "important" to
the defendant and to the public. 3 ' Both McCord's framework and Stacy and
Dayton's framework would require courts to reverse convictions where the
particular error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus both
frameworks would aggravate the problem identified above in Part II, namely,
that when an appellate court must choose between reversing a valid conviction
and narrowing the definition of an error, the court often chooses to narrow the
definition. A new framework is necessary.
B. A New Frameworkfor Applying Automatic Reversal: Chapman v.
California Revived
To avoid the consequences of automatic reversal described in Part II,
appellate courts should apply the rule only when absolutely necessary. In place
of automatic reversal, courts should instead apply the test for harmless error set
forth in Chapman and should affirm convictions if on appeal the prosecution
proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.' ' 138 If courts take the Chapman standard
seriously, then there is no need for the rule of automatic reversal for most
errors.
To see how this is so, consider the reasoning behind the Court's holding in
Gonzalez-Lopez 39 that the erroneous deprivation of defendant's counsel of
choice is a structural error. The Court, writing through Justice Scalia,
emphasized the difficulty of determining how the error contributes to the
verdict:
To determine the effect of wrongful denial of choice of counsel ... we
would not be looking for mistakes committed by the actual counsel, but
for differences in the defense that would have been made by the
rejected counsel -in matters ranging from questions asked on voir dire
and cross-examination to such intangibles as argument style and
relationship with the prosecutors. We would have to speculate upon
what matters the rejected counsel would have handled differently-or
137. Professor McCord suggests that these are the first two factors a court should consider in
deciding whether to reverse. Id. at 1454-55. Only seventh does he mention whether the error
actually contributed to the verdict. Id. Applying his test, therefore, appellate courts would
frequently be forced to reverse convictions in which an "important" right was violated, even
if the error did not contribute to the verdict.
138. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
139. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
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indeed, would have handled the same but with the benefit of a more
jury-pleasing courtroom style or a longstanding relationship of trust
with the prosecutors. And then we would have to speculate upon what
effect those different choices or different intangibles might have had.
14°
Justice Scalia is right that these questions are often extremely difficult to
answer. But that difficulty is no reason to reject the Chapman standard.
Chapman, by placing the burden on the prosecutor to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, already
requires appellate courts to reverse cases like Gonzalez-Lopez, in which it is
impossible to know whether the error contributed to the verdict. There was no
reason for the Gonzalez-Lopez Court to also hold that every case involving this
type of error will pose a similar impossibility. Surely there is some set of facts
under which the prosecution can prove that the deprivation of counsel of
choice did not contribute to the jury's verdict.
Errors like the one at issue in Gonzalez-Lopez and the three discussed above
in Part II are prohibited because they do contribute to the verdict. They
therefore can and should be reviewed on appeal under Chapman's test for
harmlessness. Chapman will require their reversal unless the appellate court can
be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that they did not contribute to this
particular verdict. If the appellate courts take Chapman seriously, then they
have all the authority they need to reverse errors whose effects on the verdict
are impossible to assess.
Yet automatic reversal should not be abolished altogether. Some types of
error must either be reversed automatically or else not at all. For example, as
discussed above in Section III.A, the right to a public trial, the right to the
absence of discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, and the right to
defend oneself at trial have nothing at all to do with ensuring that the jury's
verdict is correct. Instead, these errors serve different purposes: to ensure that
trials are transparent, to prevent racial discrimination, and to preserve the
defendant's dignity and autonomy. Under the Chapman standard, such errors
will always be "harmless" because they never contribute to the jury's decision.
Professor Eric Muller has persuasively argued this point in his discussion of
Batson error-another error reversed automatically because, as Muller
demonstrates, without the rule of automatic reversal the error would never be
reversed at all.14
1
140. Id. at 2565.
141. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Selection, and the Sixth
Amendment, 1o6 YALE L.J. 93, 116-19 (1996).
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Because the "public" nature of a trial has nothing to do with the jury's
verdict, even the most flagrant violations of the public-trial right would be
affirmed under the Chapman standard. Therefore, a judge's erroneous decision
to close a trial should be reversed automatically, not because closing the trial
made the verdict unreliable, but for just the opposite reason. If such an error is
ever to be reversed on appeal, then it must always be reversed on appeal.
The case law applying the public-trial right shows that this is true. Rather
than look at whether the decision to close a trial contributed to the verdict, it
appears instead that appellate courts ask how egregious the error was. If the
trial judge had good reasons for closing the trial, then the appellate courts will
find that no error occurred at all and thus will affirm the verdict.'42 But if the
trial judge closed the trial for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, then the
courts will find error and reverse. 43 The decision whether to reverse has
nothing to do with the Chapman standard, that is, nothing to do with whether
the error "contribute[d] to verdict obtained."'" So if we were to abolish
automatic reversal, then appellate courts would be forced to affirm most, if not
all, convictions obtained when the trial judge closed the courtroom for bad
reasons-because the prosecution will almost always be able to prove that the
error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Without automatic reversal,
appellate courts would never reverse convictions in which the trial judge
improperly closed the trial.
For errors like the denial of a public trial, courts must apply the rule of
automatic reversal if they are ever to reverse such errors. The narrowing effect
of that rule, described above in Part II, is therefore the necessary price to pay if
such errors are ever to be reversed. But we need not pay that price in regard to
other kinds of error, like biased judges and opaque reasonable-doubt
instructions. Those errors are forbidden precisely because they taint the
verdict. There is, therefore, no reason to apply the rule of automatic reversal to
such errors; they can instead be reviewed under Chapman, and the conviction
should be affirmed if the appellate court is certain, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
The framework for determining whether a given type of error is structural,
and thus requires automatic reversal, should be this: does this type of error ever
contribute to the verdict? If so, then Chapman provides the appropriate test for
reviewing the error; the conviction may be affirmed, but only if the prosecution
proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
142. See supra note 128.
143. See supra note 129.
144. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
contribute to the verdict obtained.' 14 If the type of error never contributes to
the verdict, however, then automatic reversal is the only workable rule.
Unfortunately, lower federal courts are bound by the framework set forth
by the Supreme Court in Fulminante. State courts, however, are free to adopt
the framework proposed here. There is no question that state courts may make
greater use of automatic reversal than the U.S. Supreme Court. A state may
interpret its own constitution to grant criminal defendants greater protections
than are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 146 In theory, state courts are
somewhat more limited by U.S. Supreme Court precedent when they wish to
make less use of automatic reversal because if the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that the U.S. Constitution requires that a given error be reversed
automatically, state courts must obey. 47 But in practice, this limitation is not so
great. By my count, the Supreme Court has identified only ten types of error
that must be reversed automatically. ' 8 That leaves a universe of other errors
that state courts may classify on their own. For example, state courts are free to
145. Id.
146. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032 (1983) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court will
not disturb a state ruling that rests on an "adequate and independent" state ground).
147. E.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (overturning, on direct review, the Louisiana
court's holding that a defective reasonable-doubt instruction could be harmless error).
148. The Court has stressed that "most" errors are not subject to automatic reversal under the
federal Constitution. Washington v. Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551 (2006). There are at
least ten exceptions: in addition to the three errors described in Part II, the Court has also
applied automatic reversal to the erroneous deprivation of a defendant's chosen counsel, see
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2566 (2006); to the denial of the
defendant's right to represent himself, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8
(1984); to the denial of the right to a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9
(1984); to a grand jury selected in a racially discriminatory manner, see Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254 (1986); to a petit jury selected in a discriminatory manner, see Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and to some jury selection errors in capital cases, see Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 66o-66 (1987). (Gray found per se reversible error where the
court improperly excused a juror who expressed uncertainty in his ability to vote for the
death penalty.) The Court has also reversed at least two constitutional errors without
expressly deciding whether that reversal would be automatic. See Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (reversing because the defendant was forced to wear prison garb at
trial); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (reversing because the trial judge
refused to ask prospective jurors about their racial bias). This count does not include in this
count the Court's two automatic reversals that depended on federal statutory rights of
criminal procedure. See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (vacating and
remanding an appellate decision affirming a criminal conviction because one judge sat on
the panel without statutory authority to do so); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871-
76 (1989) (reversing a federal conviction because the jury selection was overseen by a
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decide for themselves whether the failure to charge an element of the offense is
a structural error requiring automatic reversal; the federal courts are split on
this issue, and the Supreme Court has not yet resolved it.'4 9
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),' s°
federal habeas courts must defer to a state court's choice not to apply automatic
reversal."5' Though the Supreme Court has authority to review those state
interpretations de novo on direct review, it has done so only twice.'52 In short,
then, state appellate courts have discretion to fashion their own tests for
determining when a particular type of error must be reversed automatically.
And they have more reason to do so because most criminal errors take place
in state trials. In 2002, there were 35,664 felony jury trials and 55,447 felony
bench trials in the twenty-three states that record trial data.'53 In the federal
district courts, by contrast, there were only 2843 felony or class A misdemeanor
jury trials and 620 bench trials in a comparable period.' 4 More trials create
more errors to be litigated on appeal, and because state criminal trial courts
often have fewer resources and operate under tighter time pressures, state
criminal trials may produce more errors, on average, than federal trials.
5
CONCLUSION
Trial judges perform vital constitutional duties during criminal trials.
Appellate courts must explain those duties and remind trial judges of their
importance. The rule of automatic reversal creates a conflict between that
149. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
15o. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11o Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
1s. Unless the state court's decision is contrary to "clearly established Federal Law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," a federal court may not grant the
prisoner's habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (2000); see also Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct.
649, 652-53 (2006) (denying the habeas petition because the California decision was not
contrary to "clearly established" federal law).
152. Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
153. Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends
in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 764 (2004).
154. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 2003, tbl.D-4 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2oo3/contents.html
(reporting data for the twelve months ending September 30, 2003).
155. See generally Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1464-
69 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies of the resource differences between state and federal
courts).
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prospective appellate function and the retrospective appellate function of
evaluating the fairness of the particular trial below. To affirm a verdict that was
fairly obtained, the rule requiring automatic reversal forces an appellate court
to find that no error occurred, thereby narrowing the doctrinal definition of the
error.
To avoid this doctrinal consequence, appellate courts should reject the
Fulminante framework for determining when the rule of automatic reversal
applies. In its place, appellate courts should apply the rule of automatic reversal
only to types of error that never contribute to the verdict.
